We share, therefore we think

Hobson, R Peter (2007) We share, therefore we think. In: Folk psychology re-assessed. Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 41-61. ISBN 978-1-4020-5557-7

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This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze the consensual views of the subject. The contributors all maintain that current understandings of folk psychology and of the mechanisms that underlie it need to be revised, supplemented or dismissed altogether. Although there is considerable debate over which cognitive processes support our folk psychological abilities and how those abilities develop during childhood, there has up to now been a remarkable degree of consensus concerning what folk psychology involves. Most discussions begin by stating or assuming that it consists primarily of an ability to attribute propositional attitudes to humans and other organisms, in order to predict and explain their behavior. This ability is usually regarded as an underlying core that enables all social life, rather than just one amongst many ingredients of human social ability. There have been a number of recent criticisms of this orthodox characterization, which question the scope, function, reliability and even the very nature of folk psychology. They are given an airing in this text.

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Folk Psychology, Intersubjectivity Phenomenology Simulation Theory Theory of Mind
Subjects: Cognitive Processes, Theory of Mind > Theory of Mind
Department/People: Special Units
URI: https://repository.tavistockandportman.ac.uk/id/eprint/108

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